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I.  IN TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR GABRIEL WILNER 
We all have those teachers that inspired and empowered us.  Professor 
Gabriel Wilner was one of those teachers for me.  A life changing moment 
came in my second year of law school when we were holding a public event 
in 1988 on the anniversary of Cuban Missile Crisis.  We invited Dean Rusk, 
President Kennedy’s Secretary of State, and Louis B. Sohn, renowned 
international law scholar who helped draft the United Nations Charter, to 
present a panel discussion.  I was President of the Georgia Society of 
International and Comparative Law, which was hosting the event.  Professor 
Wilner came to me and said, “Mr. Birdwell, of course you are going to 
moderate the program.”  My response was: “Moderate?  Me?  Who am I to 
moderate a discussion among these giants?”  Professor Wilner would hear no 
resistance.  The event ended up being one of the great thrills of my cherished 
time at the University of Georgia School of Law.  This is but one example of 
the many opportunities that Professor Wilner created for his students to step 
onto the world stage of international law and human rights.  
II.  ABOUT THIS ARTICLE 
The premise of this Article is that one of the most effective development 
strategies to unleash unprecedented global economic growth is to create the 
right environment for capital markets to thrive.  The Article also argues that 
the single most effective use of a capital market authority’s resources is to 
build and empower a robust law enforcement program.  Finally, this Article 
will offer fourteen specific steps that governments and their securities 
authorities can take to provide a legal foundation—including model statutory 
provisions—for building and developing a world-class enforcement program 
that will help unleash the fullest potential of a capital market.   
III.  INTRODUCTION 
What is the most effective development strategy that governments and 
non-government organizations can employ to unleash the fullest potential of 
capital markets to maximize economic growth?  There seven billion people 
on the planet, and we will add another billion in about thirteen years.1  About 
                                                                                                                   
 1 World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision; Frequently Asked Questions, U.N. 
DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, http://esa.un.org/wpp/Other-Information/faq.htm (last 
updated Oct. 31, 2011). 
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half live in poverty on less than $2.50 a day.2  About thirty-six million 
people still die every year from malnutrition and preventable diseases due to 
lack of clean water.3  There are an enormous amount of jobs to create, 
mouths to feed, houses to build, power to generate, and resources to extract.  
The magnificent Edward O. Wilson notes that “[f]or every person in the 
world to reach present U.S. levels of consumption with existing technology 
would require four more planet Earths.”4  Security, justice, dignity, and 
environmental protection5 will be incomplete until these basic human needs 
are met in all corners of the world.   
Governments are concerned with taking the actions necessary to improve 
the business environment and legal infrastructure that will facilitate the 
development of technology and infrastructure necessary to meet humanity’s 
basic needs.  The economic activity necessary will dwarf all previous 
historical efforts and must be self-sustaining.  While governments must play 
a crucial role in setting the stage, this effort will require unleashing the 
private sector’s fullest potential.  The premise of this article is that well-
policed, competitive, and innovative capital markets must be at the center of 
this whirlwind of activity.  Securities markets are a way in which 
entrepreneurs and businesses can search for low cost financing—often 
unavailable from banks—to fuel their enterprises.6  The source of that 
financing is investors, who look to the stock markets to generate higher rates 
of return than may be available from other sources and to diversify their 
holdings.  These marketplaces thrive when they are characterized by honesty, 
integrity, disclosure, and transparency. 
                                                                                                                   
 2 Poverty Analysis, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/ (follow “Topics” 
hyperlink; then follow “Poverty”; then follow “Poverty Analysis”) (last visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
 3 Press Release, Comm. on Human Rights, Independent Expert on Effects of Structural 
Adjustment, Special Rapporteur on Right to Food Present Reports; Commission Continues 
General Debate on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/CN/1064 (Mar. 29, 
2001). 
 4 EDWARD O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 23 (2002). 
 5 Economic growth does not have to be inconsistent with preserving the environment.  In 
fact, economic growth is essential for long-term protection of the environment because the 
environment will always be a secondary priority so long as there are desperate humans 
seeking basic necessities for their families.   
 6 See Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the 
Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 702 (1995) (“[A 
securities market] enables the holder of loans to raise funds at a lower cost than had it 
borrowed [from banks, for example] on its own credit. . . . [S]ecuritization can lower the cost 
of funding . . . .”). 
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In terms of capital, the economic growth necessary to meet these needs 
cannot be fueled by bank lending alone.  As a source of capital, bank lending 
has its strengths, but the banking model is insufficient to meet the financial 
needs of a fast-growing, innovative economy.  Banks tend to be risk averse 
and not particularly transparent in their operations.  These two characteristics 
substantially reduce the utility of bank lending to power the economic 
growth necessary to meet humanity’s basic needs.  Banks tend to be risk 
averse because of the mismatch between their liabilities, which tend to be 
short-term, and their assets, which are often illiquid.7  However, this risk 
aversion results in many economically productive and high-value added 
projects not being financed, even though the potential returns may well 
justify the risks.  The failure to fund such efforts can greatly hamper 
economic growth.8 
The lack of transparency in banking is due, in part, to the individualized 
nature of the many loan transactions into which they enter.  To require full 
public disclosure of the details of these transactions would be prohibitively 
costly and unnecessarily compromise the proprietary or private information of 
loan recipients.  Yet, the lack of transparency in bank lending means that the 
details concerning important investment opportunities are kept behind closed 
doors and tend to be held captive by a handful of market intermediaries.9  
Indeed, in some developing countries that are dominated by bank lending, in 
my opinion, there have been decades of lost opportunity for greater economic 
growth.  It is not that banking does not have an important role to play in 
providing capital; rather, it is that public capital markets also provide a crucial 
component to efficient capital formation and economic growth.10  Moreover, 
                                                                                                                   
 7 Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2010) 
(“[B]anks rely on short-term credit (deposits) to invest in a portfolio of longer-term assets 
(loans) . . . .”). 
 8 See John K. Lawrence & Dickinson Wright, The Federal Government’s Response to the 
Credit Crisis, SP042 ALI-ABA 459, 550 (2009) (“[If] banking organizations retreat from 
making sound credit decisions, the current market conditions may be exacerbated, leading to 
slower growth and potential damage to the economy . . . .”). 
 9 See Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
923, 953–54 (2010) (“In particular, three developments threaten the effectiveness of capital 
market discipline: a decline in transparency, an increase in the percentage of equity held by 
investor intermediaries, and a decrease in accountability.”). 
 10 See Thorsten Beck, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Stock Markets Versus 
Banks?, PROPARCO’S MAG., Mar. 2010, at 23, available at http://www.ffem.fr/jahia/webdav/site/ 
proparco/shared/PORTAILS/Secteur_prive_developpement/PDF/SPD5_PDF/ProparcoRevue%2
005UK%20WEB%20020410Beck.pdf%20article%20Beck.pdf (recognizing that, while there are 
some studies that suggest that developing stock markets over banking is the superior 
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vibrant capital markets will also inform bank lending, serving not as 
competition, but as a complement to bank lending’s role in the economy. 
Contrast the banking model with the economic benefits of well-
functioning public markets for securities in which both risk and opportunity 
for return are open to any investor, are priced in a public arena with 
mandatory disclosure requirements for material information, and inform the 
economic decisions of a wide array of market participants and economic 
enterprises.11  This publicly shared information and public pricing of 
opportunities acts like a neuronal network in coordinating the many 
production and consumption decisions in the economy.  In this context, 
capital flows more efficiently and more rapidly to where the opportunities for 
return justify the risks.  Thomas Friedman aptly describes the movement of 
capital as the “Electronic Herd” that migrates to graze at the most productive 
pastures.12  They move in when conditions are right and move out just as 
quickly when conditions deteriorate.13  Nothing will send capital fleeing 
more quickly than the high costs associated with an unfavorable regulatory 
environment and endemic fraud.14  Investors will always be available to 
assume the risk of the enterprise, but they will not readily assume the risk of 
losing their investment to fraud.  The role of the government and public 
policy makers is to create the environment that will keep the electronic herd 
in your pasture.  
A long line of recent studies found a positive correlation between stock 
market development and economic growth.15  The authors of a 2007 
                                                                                                                   
development strategy to pursue, most studies indicate that the mutual complementarities 
associated with developing both the banking and stock market sectors carries the greatest 
benefit). 
 11 See David A. Westbrook, Telling All: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Ideal of 
Transparency, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 441, 453 (“[W]e should understand mandatory 
disclosure regimes as the regulatory effort to increase transparency and thereby increase 
informational efficiency of markets.”). 
 12 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 112 (2000).    
 13 Id. at 113. 
 14 See, e.g., Kroll, Global Fraud Report (2011), available at http://www.krollconsulting. 
com/insights-reports/global-fraud-reports/.  This year’s survey found that fraud concerns had 
dissuaded 48% of respondents (in a survey of 800 executives) from operating in at least one 
region or country.  Id. at 4.  Those geographies most frequently mentioned were China, from 
which 11% of respondents had been deterred, Africa with 11%, and Latin America with 10%.  
Id. at 6.  The leading worry—corruption—dissuaded more than one in six businesses from 
operating elsewhere: for that reason 63% stayed away from Africa, and 59% avoided Central 
Asia based on that concern.  Id.  
 15 See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal & Hamid Mohtadi, Financial Markets and the Financing 
Choice of Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries, 15 GLOBAL FIN. J. 57 (2004) 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper find that “improvements 
in trading of shares . . . or liquidity on African stock markets will on the 
whole boost economic growth by 3.7 percentage points.”16  This research 
suggests that these countries could double the size of their economy in 
twenty years, above the growth they would already achieve, solely by 
concentrating on improving their stock markets.  The studies identify a range 
of outstanding benefits that a well-functioning stock market can provide to 
an economy:   
●  Savings Mobilization17—savings is encouraged “by 
providing individuals with an additional financial 
instrument that may better meet their risk preferences and 
liquidity needs” 
●  Liquidity—increased liquidity means that “initial investors 
do not lose access to their savings for the duration of the 
investment project because they can easily, quickly, and 
cheaply, sell their stake in the company”18 (as Professor 
Ross Levine19 puts it: “investors will come if they can 
leave”20) 
                                                                                                                   
(examining twenty-one emerging markets over eighteen years and finding stock market 
development contributes to economic growth both directly in both the long- and short-term); 
Geert Bekaert & Campbell R. Harvey, Capital Markets: An Engine for Economic Growth, 5 
BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 33 (1998); Soumya Guha Deb & Jaydeep Mukherjee, Does Stock 
Market Development Cause Economic Growth?  A Time Series Analysis for Indian Economy, 
21 INT’L RES. J. FIN. & ECON. 1442 (2008) (setting forth causality test results that suggest that 
stock market development leads to economic growth in the Indian economy); Akinlo A. 
Enisan & Akinlo O. Olufisayo, Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: Evidence 
from Seven Sub-Sahara African Countries, 61 J. ECON. & BUS. 162 (2009); Ross Levine & 
Sara Zervos, Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth, 10 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 
323 (1996); Muhammad Shahbaz et al., Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: 
Ardl Causality in Pakistan, 14 INT’L RES. J. FIN. & ECON. 182 (2008) (finding a very strong 
relationship between stock market development and economic growth). 
 16 Charles Amo Yartey & Charles Komla Adjasi, Stock Market Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa 16 (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 209, 2007), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07209.pdf.  
 17 Id. at 14. 
 18 Id. at 5. 
 19 Ross Levine is the James and Merryl Tisch Professor of Economics and Director of the 
William R. Rhodes Center for International Economics and Finance at Brown University.  
Ross Levine, RESEARCH AT BROWN: DIRECTORY OF RESEARCH & RESEARCHERS AT BROWN, 
http://research.brown.edu/research/profile.php?id=1130162236 (last visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
 20 Ross Levine, Stock Markets: A Spur to Economic Growth, 33 FIN. & DEV. 7 (1996). 
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●  Risk Diversification—more financial products are 
available, which can also facilitate investments in high-
return projects21 
●  Information Dissemination—securities markets acquire 
and disseminate information efficiently through company 
disclosures and through the stock prices of companies22 
●  Corporate Governance—is improved through 
transparency and disclosure23 
●  Long-Term Capital—is perpetually available for both 
government and private sector industrial and infrastructure 
projects24 
●  Lower cost of capital—is available to growing companies 
(so long as the market operates efficiently)25 
●  Reduced risk of credit crunches—because companies are 
less dependent on bank financing26  
●  Efficiency—securities markets allocate capital to 
productive investments, leading to economic growth27  
Given that securities markets can dramatically increase economic growth 
and development, and may well be the most efficient and powerful engine 
for economic growth in existence, the next questions should be: What can 
governments do to create a favorable environment for a stock market to 
thrive at its fullest potential?  What international best practices can be 
identified and adopted to give developing markets the opportunity to leap 
ahead and build world class financial markets without having to suffer the 
decades of growing pains, mistakes, and periodic crises that have 
characterized the historical development of the most advanced markets?28   
This Article argues that the answers lie primarily in developing the 
enforcement capacity of the security authority.  The premise is that a 
government’s best strategy is to focus on protecting investors through a 
                                                                                                                   
 21 Levine & Zervos, supra note 15, at 327. 
 22 Yartey & Adjasi, supra note 16, at 4. 
 23 Id. at 25. 
 24 Id. at 5. 
 25 Id. at 4. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Bekaert & Harvey, supra note 15, at 1. 
 28 For an excellent discussion of the lessons from the latest financial crisis, see John H. 
Walsh, Combating Fraud in the Caribbean Region: Lessons from Recent Events, 3 GEO. 
MASON J. INT’L L. 116 (2011). 
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robust enforcement program, and to leave the business decisions and most 
“market development” initiatives to the collective decision making of the 
capital market participants.  While there are undoubtedly many capital 
markets that would benefit from demutualization, regionalization, and 
automation, the enduring problem with most capital markets today is that 
they are operating at only a fraction of their potential because they are rife 
with fraudulent behavior and abuse, including financial disclosure and 
accounting fraud, insider trading, market manipulation, pyramid schemes and 
customer abuse by market intermediaries.  An IMF Working Paper reviewing 
International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) Assessments 
in seventy-four countries found that “a consistent theme emerges regarding 
the lack of ability of regulators in many countries to effectively enforce 
compliance with existing rules and regulations” which the authors 
characterize as the “overriding weakness.”29  These market abuses and 
fraudulent schemes render capital markets unable to function the way they 
are supposed to and incapable of generating the benefits outlined above.  
This Article focuses on identifying those strategies and tools that a securities 
authority can employ to create a clean and honest market that is a pre-
requisite for driving the economic growth that is so important. 
IV.  WHY ENFORCEMENT ENHANCES MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
There are two competing philosophies driving securities authorities.  The 
first, and perhaps most prevalent, is the view of securities authorities who see 
their role as primarily regulatory; that is, they emphasize the regulation of the 
business conduct of the market intermediaries whom they regulate, but they 
place less emphasis on bringing enforcement actions.30  This, by the way, is 
also characteristic of most banking regulatory authorities whose driving 
philosophy is safety and soundness.  This approach was represented most 
visibly, at least until recently, by the United Kingdom’s Financial Services 
Authority, which considered itself “emphatically not an enforcement-led 
regulator.”31  In stark contrast, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
                                                                                                                   
 29 Ana Carvajal & Jennifer Elliot, Strengths and Weaknesses in Securities Market 
Regulation: A Global Analysis 5 (IMF, Working Paper No. 107/259, 2007), available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07259.pdf. 
 30 See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 350 (2010) 
(discussing the prevalence of the regulatory view and the lesser-used enforcement approach). 
 31 John Tiner, Chief Exec., Fin. Servs. Auth., Address at the FSA Enforcement Law 
Conference (June 16, 2006), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communicatio 
n/Speeches/2006/0616_jt.shtml. 
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(SEC) is “first and foremost . . . a law enforcement agency.”32  Enforcement 
represents the SEC’s largest program area and most visible public face.33 
The mission of most securities authorities includes promoting market 
development.34  Given this focus, many developing market regulators may 
argue that the emphasis on enforcement would not work because as a smaller 
market trying to develop and compete they do not want to stifle and burden 
their market.  This Article argues that this argument is flawed.  The Article’s 
conclusion is that a strong emphasis on enforcement by markets at any level 
of development is the key to market growth and prosperity. 
A.  Enforcement Lowers the Cost of Capital 
Every securities market has varying degrees of financial disclosure and 
accounting fraud, insider trading, market manipulation, customer abuses by 
broker-dealers and investment advisors, and pyramid schemes.  There will be 
companies and their principals that will try to “cook their books” and hide 
their true state of affairs from the public with omissions, half-truths, and 
outright lies.  There will be market manipulators who distort stock prices 
through misrepresentations, while buying or selling their own stock at the 
artificial prices.  There will be insider traders that buy or sell with an unfair 
and anti-competitive information advantage, potentially giving the 
impression to the average investor that the market is unfairly rigged.  There 
will be boiler-rooms that make cold calls to investors and convince them to 
buy the next “sure thing,” and there will be pyramid scheme operators who 
rally investors around fictitious investments and use new investor funds to 
pay off old investors rather than investing in a real venture.  A compliance 
officer at a large international securities firm once told me that he recognized 
that, given the scale of the operations of the firm it was likely that at any 
given time an employee was engaged in wrongdoing, such as front-running, 
churning (excessive buying and selling that generates excessive wealth-
destroying fees), or unauthorized transactions in client accounts.  These are 
the abuses that eat away at capital markets, destroy investor confidence, and 
increase the cost of capital.  The fraudsters may represent a small minority of 
                                                                                                                   
 32 The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec. 
gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
 33 Id. 
 34 For example, the U.S. SEC’s mission “is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”  Id. 
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a market, but this small minority can ruin the market for everyone because 
customers and investors cannot determine who is telling the truth.   
Numerous capital markets have stagnated because their securities 
authorities have insufficient powers to address the fraud and abuse described 
above.  Most capital markets are suffering from what Nobel Laureate 
economist George Akerlof once described as the “lemons problem.”35  Any 
market characterized by an asymmetry of information between the buyers 
and the sellers—where the sellers know much more than the buyers about 
what is being sold—can suffer from this problem (like the market for used 
cars).  In a securities market, the problem is that—since the buyers cannot 
tell who is being honest regarding the quality of financial instruments and 
services being offered and who is being dishonest—buyers are only willing 
to pay a price that reflects the expectation that they might be deceived.  As 
Professor Black describes it: 
Investors don’t know which companies are truthful and which 
aren’t, so they discount the prices they will offer for the shares 
of all companies. . . .  Discounted share prices mean that an 
honest issuer can’t receive fair value for its shares, and has an 
incentive to use other forms of financing.  But discounted 
prices won’t discourage dishonest issuers. . . .  The tendency 
for high-quality issuers to leave the market because they can’t 
obtain a fair price for their shares, while low-quality issuers 
remain, worsens the lemons or “adverse selection” problem 
that investors face.  Investors rationally react to the lower 
average quality of issuers by discounting still more the prices 
they will pay.  This drives even more highquality [sic] issuers 
out of the market and exacerbates adverse selection.36  
Professor Black further explains that:   
[M]any nations have not developed an acceptable solution to 
this problem [of informational asymmetry].  Their securities 
markets have instead fallen into what insurance companies call 
a “death spiral,” in which information asymmetry and adverse 
                                                                                                                   
 35 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 36 Bernard Black, The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets, 55 BUS. 
LAW. 1565, 1567–68 (2000). 
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selection combine to drive almost all honest issuers out of the 
market and to drive share prices to zero.  In [those] countries, a 
few large companies may develop reputations sufficient to 
justify a public offering of shares at a price that, though below 
fair value, is still attractive compared to other financing 
options.  But smaller companies have essentially no direct 
access to public investors’ capital.  They must obtain capital 
from intermediaries (usually banks), or through the internal 
capital market of a conglomerate group, or else grow only at 
the rate permitted by reinvestment of past earnings.37   
In sum, the prevalence of fraud and abuse can destroy a securities market, 
as investors continue to further discount the prices they are willing to pay for 
securities, while the honest issuers flee for the exits.38  For those issuers that 
remain in such a market, this results in a higher cost of capital.39  This is 
highly damaging to a country’s economic prospects.  Businesses will not 
engage in real investment (in plant and equipment, infrastructure, training 
and so forth) unless the expected rate of return from such projects exceeds 
the cost of capital.40  As a consequence, a high cost of capital results in very 
little real investment.  This means less job creation, lower incomes, and less 
economic growth than there would be otherwise.  If the cost of capital can be 
decreased, businesses have an incentive to increase real investment, resulting 
in more jobs, higher income, and greater economic growth.41  If a country 
can reduce the prevalence of fraudsters in its capital market, it will 
dramatically lower its cost of capital and thereby stimulate economic growth. 
                                                                                                                   
 37 Id. at 1570–71. 
 38 See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 944 (1998) (“[I]f 
investors are unable to distinguish high quality issues from low quality issues due to a lack of 
disclosure or unduly weak insider trading laws, investors may discount the price of all issues.  
This may drive leading high quality issues to more favorable regimes that allow them to 
distinguish themselves from the low quality issues.”). 
 39 See id. (“To the extent [fraud] occurs, investors may withdraw from the market, which 
decreases market liquidity and raises the cost of capital.”). 
 40 Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1112 (1999) (“[A business] should reinvest profits only when the new 
projects promise expected returns at a level equal to or in excess of the corporation’s cost of 
capital.”). 
 41 See Robert W. McGee, Principles of Taxation for Emerging Economies: Lessons from 
the U.S. Experience, 12 DICK. J. INT’L L. 29, 76 (1993) (describing the positive correlation 
between increased investment and employment, income, and economic growth rates). 
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The good news is that enforcement tools are the most productive and 
cost-effective means of cleaning out fraud and abuse and, thus, of lowering 
the cost of capital.42  Recent studies demonstrate that the “enforcement 
intensity” of a securities regulator lowers the cost of capital.43  For example, 
the U.S. securities market achieves an extremely low cost of capital due, in 
part, to its vigorous enforcement program.44  Similarly, a study of the 
European Union’s implementation of the market abuse directives and 
transparency regulations found that “market liquidity increases and firms’ 
cost of capital decreases” and that these positive effects were largely 
dependent on the degree of enforcement.45  Professor Coffee explains this 
using a “bonding hypothesis” whereby stock issuing companies seek out 
markets with strong enforcement so they can bond to a quality regulator.46  In 
bonding, companies are providing an implicit assurance to investors that they 
can have a relatively higher degree of confidence that the stock price is fairly 
and accurately priced.  This lowers their cost of capital.47  The important 
lesson here is that the studies have shown that having the best rule books in 
the world will not reduce the cost of capital—only enforcement of those rules 
lowers the cost of capital.  This bonding hypothesis strongly suggests that an 
important way to facilitate market development and capital formation is to 
focus resources on developing an enforcement program that achieves visible 
results.  The emphasis on enforcement is not only fully consistent with 
market development but also a necessary condition.  
                                                                                                                   
 42 John Coffee, ‘Regulation-Lite’ Belongs to a Different Age, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2008),  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fe8950a6-c776-11dc-10b4-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1JifQj792  
(“Ultimately, stricter enforcement yields . . . a lower cost of capital [resulting in] a higher 
gross domestic product and lower unemployment.”). 
 43 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 229, 230 (2007) (“[H]igher enforcement intensity gives the U.S. economy a lower cost 
of capital and higher securities valuations.”); see also Uptal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, 
The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75 (2008) (finding the cost of equity is reduced 
by approximately 5% if insider trading laws are enforced); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, 
Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. 
ECON. 207 (2009).  
 44 Coffee, supra note 43. 
 45 See Hans B. Christensen et al., Capital Market Effects of Securities Regulation: The Role 
of Implementation and Enforcement (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 16737, 
Jan. 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16737. 
 46 Coffee, supra note 43, at 235. 
 47 Id. 
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B.  Enforcement Is Efficient   
On one hand, equity markets can be extraordinarily innovative and 
dynamic and—may flourish best if allowed to run untethered to government 
restraints.  Certainly, to be innovative and efficient, the private sector 
generally needs an atmosphere in which executives and managers can make 
and execute operational and capital decisions without needing to seek prior 
governmental approval or being second-guessed by the government.  On the 
other hand, history, experience, and theory suggest that capital markets are 
magnets for fraud and abuse, conflicts of interest, systemic risks, and other 
imperfections and that the government is in the best position to correct these 
problems and level the playing field.  What, then, is the correct philosophy or 
optimal balance that securities authorities should pursue? 
All indications suggest that securities authorities, if they have not already 
done so, would be best served by shifting their regulatory philosophy from a 
primarily ex ante approach to a more ex post approach.   Many securities 
authorities, particularly those that seem to adopt a banking regulator 
mentality, tend to micromanage their market on the one hand, while largely 
failing to sufficiently punish wrongdoers in the marketplace in order to deter 
future market misconduct on the other hand.  With ex ante regulation, a 
regulated entity’s business decisions are subject to merit-based pre-approvals 
by the securities authority.48  Such ex ante regulation imposes costs, 
uncertainty and delay, not only on potential wrongdoers, but also on all 
honest market participants.49  Moreover, market growth and innovation will 
be dragged down by the finite staff and resources of the regulatory authority 
as they are unable to keep up with the authorizations, licenses, and 
applications.50  At the same time, because such an approach is not well-
targeted at preventing wrongdoing, there are still market failures and frauds.  
In sum, the ex ante approach to regulation typically fails in its effort to “play 
it safe” and, at the same time, hinders market development.  Indeed, it is the 
worst approach to developing a market.   
                                                                                                                   
 48 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of 
Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1279 (1999) (describing the workings of 
an ex ante preclearance regulatory scheme). 
 49 Id. at 1316 (“[E]x ante enforcement by its nature imposes delay since preview and 
approval takes time, and during that time activity must be suspended.  This delay is in itself 
costly to society since the economic (or other) benefits of the regulated activity are foregone 
or deferred.”). 
 50 Id. at 1320. 
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In contrast, an ex post approach to regulation takes the government out of 
private sector decisions and focuses first and foremost on enforcement as a 
means of punishing and deterring market abuse, customer abuse, and fraud.  
An ex post approach has the great advantage in that it places most of the cost 
of abuse on those that commit it, rather than on the honest players and the 
market as a whole.  Similarly, an enforcement-led approach prioritizes 
precious public and regulatory resources into going after the violators,51 
which are, after all, the source of the problems.  Simply put, to develop the 
marketplace, securities authorities need to increase the expected costs on the 
dishonest market participants while lowering costs for the honest players.   
While attention should be paid to carefully crafting cost-effective 
regulation and supervision systems that reduce conflicts of interest and 
opportunities for fraud and abuse, without a credible threat of sanctions and a 
demonstrable track record of successful enforcement actions, it is certain that 
rules will not be obeyed, thereby undermining the authority of both the 
regulation and the regulator.  Some have charged that the U.S. SEC 
“regulates through enforcement.”  U.S. SEC staff counter that they are 
simply “enforcing the regulations.”  There must be “trophies on the wall” in 
the form of conspicuous successful enforcement actions with meaningful 
sanctions.   
C.  It Is Impossible to Regulate Away Wrongdoing 
It is simply impossible for even the smartest, risk-based, algorithm-
endowed securities authority to regulate away all wrongdoing or eliminate 
every instance of fraud and abuse before it begins.  For example, corporate 
financial and disclosure fraud is so sophisticated and complicated that it is 
almost impossible to detect until after it has occurred.  Not many investors, 
or even market analysts, can verify a company’s financial statements and 
conduct the extensive investigation required to ensure that the financial 
statements and other disclosures by the company are complete, accurate, and 
meet all the accounting standards.  Few individuals fully understand the 
details of, say, accounting standards that cover derivative transactions to a 
degree that would ensure compliance, and few have access to the company’s 
internal information to verify the transactions.  Even fewer could do so if the 
company’s officers lie to the accountants.  Fraudsters are often sophisticated 
                                                                                                                   
 51 Id. 
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in disguising their wrongdoing, and, moreover, may have the complicity of 
the gatekeeper accountants, bankers and/or lawyers.   
The reality is that no one in a market-based society, including the 
government, is in a position to second–guess the professionals in real time 
and to double-check with the counterparties to every transaction to ensure the 
accuracy of revenues, expenses, and other reported data.  Nor could a system 
operate efficiently under such constraints.  Soaring transaction costs would 
completely undermine any economic growth possibilities.52  Nonetheless, 
with respect to financial reporting fraud at least, the truth eventually tends to 
come out.  When it does, a securities authority must have an enforcement 
program that will not only address the immediate problem but also deter 
others contemplating similar behavior.53  In a world where it is difficult to 
detect wrongdoing, the importance of wrongdoers eventually having to pay a 
high price for their misdeeds is paramount.  Otherwise, fraud will have 
positive expected returns, and, consequently, there will be excessive amounts 
of fraud that will thoroughly undermine the market.  Nothing sends a clear 
message like a good, solid enforcement case. 
V.  BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE CAPITAL MARKETS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 
Fraud destroys markets, destroys companies and destroys investors’ 
wealth.   If investors cannot rely on the corporate disclosures, the integrity of 
market-determined prices, and the basic honesty of market intermediaries, 
then the entire system breaks down.  The cost of capital will increase.  The 
good businesses will pull out of the market, and—to put it bluntly—the 
market will be left with mostly liars and thieves. 
A securities commission must be empowered with the necessary tools to 
catch the wrongdoers and make them pay a price sufficient to deter the bulk 
of market fraud.  A relentless enforcement program underpins the entire 
regulatory system by creating the deterrence that keeps the majority of 
people following the rules.  An effective enforcement program must both 
produce the impression and the reality that these frauds and abuses are 
                                                                                                                   
 52 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions As Pragmatic Ex Post 
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 77 (2008) (“[M]inimal ex ante interference enhances market 
freedom and innovation: in return for regulating consequences, we gain novel products, new 
businesses, competitive pricing, and employment opportunities, all generally unobstructed by 
ex ante constraints.”). 
 53 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 48, at 1320 (“Ex post enforcement, on the other hand, 
might be effectively employed to deter violations even in high-volume contexts through the 
imposition of stiff penalties.”). 
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routinely detected, relentlessly pursued, and dealt with effectively.  The 
second part of this Article outlines some of the best techniques available for 
building an effective enforcement program, with emphasis on techniques that 
are often lacking in many jurisdictions, yet offer the greatest potential return.   
A.  Step 1: Establish an Independent, Stand-Alone Enforcement Program 
with a Mandate 
1.  An Enforcement Mandate 
Securities authorities should establish a stand-alone civil enforcement 
program that is vested with responsibility for investigating and prosecuting 
all serious violations.54  Capital markets are dominated by powerful and 
sophisticated persons who are entrusted with managing other peoples’ assets.  
Consequently, the securities authority must have the authority, autonomy, 
and resources not only to promulgate effective regulations that minimize 
opportunities for abuse but also to take swift and effective enforcement 
action against those who abuse the system.   
An effective enforcement program should be designed to achieve the 
following foundational goals: 
●  Protect investors by bringing enforcement cases designed 
to protect them from fraud and abuse; 
●  Stop ongoing fraud via injunctive orders and asset freezes; 
●  Deter illegal conduct by bringing enforcement actions 
with demonstrable consequences for wrongdoing; 
●  Disgorge illegal profits from violators; 
●  Bar professionals from the industry if they have 
committed fraud; and  
●  Maintain confidence that the market is fair and honest.  
A number of securities authorities do not have stand-alone enforcement 
programs or have programs diluted with other responsibilities.   
                                                                                                                   
 54 See, e.g., Ethiopis Tafara, Dir., Office of Int’l Affairs, U.S. SEC, The Benefits of 
Enforcement Division, Remarks at the Brazilian Securities Comm’n 30th Anniv. Celebration 
(Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch090506et.htm. 
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2.  Jurisdiction 
The enforcement program must be vested with full statutory powers to 
investigate, compel evidence from, and prosecute any person suspected of 
violating the securities laws.55  Many regulatory authorities have capacity to 
pursue only licensed or registered persons.   These limited powers prevent 
authorities from properly policing the full range of frauds that can undermine 
their marketplace.  Unlike the banking sector, securities law violations are 
often committed by unregistered or unlicensed persons.  To illustrate the 
diversity of persons that may be the subject of a securities authority’s 
enforcement portfolio, the U.S. SEC has brought enforcement actions against 
a fifteen-year-old teenager,56 a retired seamstress grandmother in Croatia,57 
the State of New Jersey,58 a chemist at the Food and Drug Administration,59 a 
foreign regulator,60 and the owner of the Dallas Mavericks basketball team.61  
Nearly 50% of the U.S. SEC’s actions are against non-registered persons and 
entities. 
3.  Staffing 
Investigating and prosecuting securities fraud requires leadership by 
individuals who are relentless in investigating complaints, tips, referrals, and 
                                                                                                                   
 55 See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(a)(1)–(b) (West 2011) 
(“The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems necessary to 
determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any provision of 
this chapter . . . .”). 
 56 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Brings Fraud Charges in Internet Manipulation Scheme (Sept. 
20, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2000-135.txt (charging a teenager for 
manipulating stock over the internet).   
 57 See Press Release, SEC, Court Freezes Additional Accounts Linked to Suspicious Trades 
in Reebok (Aug. 19, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19340.htm 
(naming Sonya Anticevic whose accounts were used to trade in Reebok securities). 
 58 See In re New Jersey, Release No. 9135, Aug. 18, 2010, Administrative Proceeding File 
No. 3-14009, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/33-9135.pdf (charging the 
State for fraudulent municipal bond offerings). 
 59 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges FDA Chemist with Insider Trading Ahead of Drug 
Approval Announcement (Mar. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/ 
2011-76.htm. 
 60 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Two Accountants and Antiguan Regulator for Roles in 
Stanford Ponzi Scheme (June 19, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/20 
09-140.htm (alleging the CEO of Antigua’s Financial Services Regulatory Commission 
accepted bribes to ignore a Ponzi scheme). 
 61 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against Mark Cuban (Nov. 
17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20810.htm. 
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cases and in prosecuting those who are responsible for wrongdoing.  Those 
same individuals must also possess a commitment to public service, the 
professionalism and discretion to prioritize cases, and be guided by 
principles of fairness and justice.  Among others, investigative staff should 
be comprised of lawyers, accountants, and former police investigators, who 
are committed to aggressively rooting out wrongdoing and are trained in 
gathering evidence and prosecuting cases.  A primary advantage in having 
both investigative and prosecutorial functions in the same department is that 
the prosecutors will be readily available to provide guidance on the evidence 
necessary to meet the legal elements of any potential prosecutions. 
4.  Independence 
The enforcement program should also have the prosecutorial discretion to 
open or close its own investigations at any time (subject to oversight) and not 
have to wait on reports or referrals from other offices and departments before 
using its own staff to request or compel information to further an investigation.  
The enforcement program also should not have to cede prosecutorial authority 
to another agency.  Empowering one agency with both the responsibility and 
accountability for this mission is the best assurance of success.  As Napoleon 
said, “[O]ne bad general is worth two good ones.”62   
The enforcement program cannot be independent if the securities 
authority itself is not operationally independent.  A capital market regulator 
should be structured by law as an independent regulatory and law 
enforcement agency that is empowered with the discretion to regulate, 
investigate, and bring enforcement proceedings to protect investors and to 
keep the capital market clean and honest, all while free of political influence.  
Securities authorities are often organized under a finance ministry or central 
bank, which often retains authority to approve budgets, hiring, and even 
proposed rules, regulations, and enforcement actions.  The lack of self-
funding nearly led to the shutdown of most SEC operations in early 2011.  
This lack of independence typically results in an impediment to progress in a 
securities market because the securities authority is unable to act swiftly and 
decisively in response to ever-changing market conditions.  The 
independence of securities regulators is one of the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Principles.63   
                                                                                                                   
 62 WILLIAM MILLIGAN SLOANE, LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 382 (1894). 
 63 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS (IOSCO), OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 4 (2010) [hereinafter IOSCO], available at http://www.compliance-exchange. 
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The securities authority should consist of officials who act through 
majority vote and who sever their ties to the industry to avoid conflicts of 
interest.  Ensuring that final agency action, such as enforcement actions, are 
authorized by a majority vote by the securities authority as an institutional 
body, rather than by an individual officer or chairman, helps insulate staff 
and officials and eliminates pressure points that render the securities 
authority vulnerable to undue influence. 
5.  Accountability 
Independence must, of course, be balanced with accountability to the 
public and to the law.  There must always be a higher authority.  Typically, 
securities authorities are subject to oversight by a legislative committee, 
which is necessary and appropriate so long as it avoids undue political 
influence over agency operational decision making.  Proposed rules and 
regulations should be published to provide the industry and the public a 
formal comment period, and comments received should be considered by the 
securities authority before finalizing regulations.  All final actions and 
decisions by the regulator, including enforcement actions, should be 
transparent, public, and subject to judicial oversight and review.  However, 
judicial review should involve some deference to the expertise of the 
securities authority, and the degree of deference should correlate to the 
quality of the administrative and deliberative process at the agency level.  
The securities law can prohibit courts from substituting their judgment for 
that of the securities authority and from overturning the agency’s decisions in 
absence of arbitrary application or abuse of discretion granted under the 
securities law statute.64  
6.  Immunity for Staff 
No employee or official of a securities authority should be exposed to 
personal liability so long as he or she is acting within the scope of his or her 
statutory responsibilities.  Such exposure has the potential of significantly 
limiting staff initiative and discouraging them from aggressively performing 
investigations.  This is of particular concern in cases where the subject(s) 
                                                                                                                   
com/governance/library/ioscoprinciples2010.pdf. 
 64 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (granting administrative deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute it 
administers).   
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under investigation for potential securities law violations might be wealthy, 
powerful, or otherwise politically connected individuals who are in a position 
to influence or stop an investigation by intimidation and threats of legal action.   
There should also be a provision for the defense of staff accused of 
wrongdoing or improper motives in discharging their official duties pending 
a finding on the merits.  Obviously, any such defense would not extend to 
actions such as taking bribes, stealing, misusing confidential information, 
and other actions taken outside the scope of their statutory responsibilities.  If 
the employee is exonerated, he or she should suffer no pecuniary or non-
pecuniary impact. 
The problem of threats and intimidation may be particularly complex and 
compounded in smaller markets because the market participants and 
regulators typically know each other.  Market participants tend to be the 
wealthy, powerful, and politically connected, and it is not uncommon for 
them to use their position to achieve short-term gain at the unfair expense of 
others.65  Governments must provide backing and cover for the courageous 
individuals who seek to do public service and reform markets because it will 
often mean having to go after the rich, entrenched, and powerful. 
7.  Ethics 
A securities authority must set the standards that will serve to guide and, 
where necessary change, corporate and market culture.  This can occur only 
if the securities authority and its staff are perceived as professionals that are 
beyond reproach.  The regulatory authority should be empowered to hire 
staff that will carry out their public service duties in a fair, professional, and 
impartial manner.  The staff must be bound by a vigorous ethics program that 
should be institutionalized and visible.  A poster at the airport in Abuja, 
Nigeria summed it up well: “Corruption Kills a Country.”  The same can be 
                                                                                                                   
 65 For example, Perfecto Yasay, Chairman of the Philippines SEC from 1995–2000, 
courageously resisted pressure from the President of the Philippines, Joseph Estrada (who was 
later impeached), to drop a market manipulation investigation involving one of the President’s 
business associates.  Wayne Arnold, Widening Breach Develops in Philippine Insider Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at C8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/business/inte 
rnational-business-widening-breach-develops-in-philippine-insider-case.html?src=pm.  More 
tragically, Andrei Kozlov, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Central Bank, who led the Central 
Bank’s fight against corruption in the banking industry, was assassinated on September 13, 2006.  
Helene Cooper, U.S. Releases Rights Report, with an Acknowledgement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 
2007, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/07/Washington/07diplo.html. 
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said of the effects of corruption on a capital market.66  Since ethics is an area 
that takes ongoing vigilance, every securities authority should have an 
institutionalized ethics program that is available at all times to staff and 
officials.67 
B.  Step 2: Build Capacity to Respond to Specific Securities Law Violations 
The enforcement program should develop the in-house, standing capacity 
and expertise to focus on the six primary categories of securities law 
violations that are endemic to all capital markets: 
1.  Financial accounting fraud and disclosure violations by 
stock issuing companies; 
2.  Insider trading; 
3.  Market manipulation; 
4.  Broker-dealer and investment advisor violations, (such as 
front running, churning, unauthorized transactions, 
commingling of assets, and compliance failures68); 
5.  Self-regulatory organization violations; and 
6.  Offering frauds like pyramid schemes, boiler rooms, and 
other unauthorized securities offerings.69 
Any one of these frauds and abuses, if left unchecked, has the potential to 
undermine a capital market and do massive damage to investors.70  This 
                                                                                                                   
 66 See generally Kroll, supra note 14 (outlining the effect of fraud and corruption on 
international business decisions).  
 67 An example is the U.S. SEC’s ethics program.  Office of the Ethics Counsel, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ethics.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
 68 See, e.g., Sample Practices That Violate Regulations, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/QualificationsExams/ReglisteredReps/B 
rochure/P009869 (last visited Aug. 20, 2011) (detailing the rules against such practices by 
broker-dealers). 
 69 See, e.g., Investor Alerts, Avoiding Investment Scams, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,  
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/FraudsAndScams/P118010 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2011) (describing the various types of investment offering fraud). 
 70 See, e.g., Bashar H. Malkawi & Haitham A. Haloush, Reflections on the Securities Law 
of Jordan, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 763, 798 (2008) (“The offenses of insider trading and 
market manipulation are the most detrimental to the creation of investor confidence in the 
capital market.”).  It is worth noting that in the U.S. there is one elegantly simple statute that is 
the foundation for most SEC enforcement actions involving fraud.  See Section 10(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf.  A comparable sample statute would read: 
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requires training for the enforcement staff on how to handle these cases.  
Countries with larger markets may want to consider specialized units that 
cultivate and maintain expertise in each of these areas.71  Three of these areas 
are discussed in further detail below. 
1.  Financial Disclosure Fraud 
Disclosure is the foundation of the capital market—it facilitates exchange, 
honesty, confidence, growth, and development.72  The mission of securities 
authorities is to protect investors and promote capital formation, and 
disclosure is the tool that accomplishes both of these things.73  A securities 
authority must ensure that issuing companies, and their auditors, accountants, 
and other “gatekeepers,” are accountable to provide investors with complete, 
accurate, and timely disclosures of all material information that a reasonable 
investor would want to know before making an investment decision.74  
Investors cannot properly assess and manage risk unless they are confident 
that the information available regarding stock issuing companies is complete, 
                                                                                                                   
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the securities authority may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
 71 The SEC, for example, has taken this approach in its post-Madoff Ponzi scheme reforms, 
with specialized divisions for different types of fraud.  See Post-Madoff Reforms, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm (last modified 
Oct. 8, 2010). 
 72 See Oren A. Amram, When Worlds Collide: Transfer Pricing Tax Strategies and the 
Securities Laws, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 324, 332 (2008) (noting that the history of the U.S. 
disclosure regime is grounded in aims “to achieve transparency in capital markets”); see also 
Preliminary Response of the Commission to the Recommendations of the Advisory 
Committee on Corporate Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 5,906, 14 S.E.C. Docket 178 
(Feb. 15, 1978) (“The basic objective of the disclosure requirements is to increase investor 
confidence and to make the securities markets more efficient and as fair and honest as 
possible.”). 
 73 See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “A 
Moderate Capital,” 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 80 (2006) (“[The SEC], in crafting the disclosures 
[for a particular regulation] carefully and expertly strikes a balance between reasonable 
protection of investors and capital formation.”). 
 74 Canada, for example, has a “gatekeeper” regime applicable to material disclosures by 
“directors, lawyers, auditors, underwriters, credit rating agencies (CRAs), financial analysts, 
and retail investment advisors (RIAs).”  Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Corporate Gatekeeper Liability 
in Canada, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441, 442 (2007). 
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accurate, and timely.75  This means that investors must have access to both 
good and bad material information about a company, its management, and its 
financial statements.76   
To illustrate the potential impact if a disclosure program is ineffective, 
one may look to the financial reporting fraud crisis in the U.S. Enron 
imploded in November 2001.77  The collapse of WorldCom followed in July 
2002, which was characterized by accounting improprieties of unprecedented 
magnitude and resulted in the largest corporate bankruptcy in history. 78  The 
aggregate market value of the Wilshire 5,000 stock index is estimated to 
have declined $8.7 trillion from March 2000 to October 2002,79  a market 
capitalization loss of nearly 50%.80  The loss of jobs and losses to investors 
were devastating to the U.S. economy and society.81  The lesson from this 
analysis is that regulation and enforcement programs that are insufficient to 
quickly address disclosure failures may have catastrophic results.  
Conversely, a successful disclosure and enforcement regime may result in 
doubling of market value!   
                                                                                                                   
 75 See Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear A Good Thing Is Coming to an End: 
The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 729 (1999) (“The more 
information investors have, the better able they are to make optimal investment choices.”). 
 76 Per the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, “[t]he term ‘material,’ when used to 
qualify a requirement for furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information 
required to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor 
would attach importance in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered.”  17 
C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2011) (emphasis added) (implying that material information of both good 
and bad effect must be provided to investors), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea 
34.pdf. 
 77 Enron filed for bankruptcy in November 2001.  See Douglas M. Branson, Enron–When 
All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 
VILL. L. REV. 989, 1018 (2003). 
 78 See David Teather, Corporate America’s Path to a Very Public Humbling, GUARDIAN 
(U.K.), Dec. 19, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 15182204 (“WorldCom . . . became the largest 
ever bankruptcy in July [2002] after being discovered operating the largest alleged fraud.”). 
 79 Tom Walker, Market Mauling Now 41% Erased, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 2, 2003, at 
D1, available at 2003 WLNR 6234154 (“At its worst point, investors had lost $8.7 trillion in 
market value between March 24, 2000, when the Wilshire peaked, and Oct. 9, 2002.”). 
 80 The S&P Index declined over 45% from the high of March 2000 to June 2002.  See Alex 
Berenson, The Nation: Scream!; Hold on for a Wild Ride, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/21/weekinreview/21BERE.html. 
 81 Beth Piskora, Wall Street Anticipates a Week of Watching, N.Y. POST, Nov. 4, 2002, at 
31, available at 2002 WLNR 12311057 (detailing the extreme loss of jobs and investor 
uneasiness during the 2002 downturn in the U.S.). 
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2.  Insider Trading 
Insider trading is unfair buying or selling of a company’s stock “while in 
possession of material, non-public information” about the company or 
stock.82  Many markets are characterized by pervasive insider trading, which 
is unfortunate because it raises the cost of capital.83  However, in general, 
there are comparatively few instances of successful prosecution of insider 
trading outside the U.S.84  In contrast, the U.S. SEC successfully prosecutes 
about fifty civil insider trading cases each year, which routinely result in the 
defendants disgorging all of their profits (or losses avoided) and paying a 
penalty “up to three times the amount of profit gained, or loss avoided.”85  
This disparity may be attributable to the SEC’s use of non-criminal remedies 
and powerful investigative tools, which will be discussed in more detail in 
Step 4 below.   
Insider trading is difficult to investigate and prosecute under both a civil 
“preponderance of the evidence” or the criminal “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard.86  One of my colleagues had the idea of a strict liability 
standard to address the difficulties in investigating and proving insider 
trading cases.  Under such a legal standard, gains (or losses avoided) by 
insiders would be disgorged in circumstances where it was simply 
demonstrated that the trader traded while in possession of inside 
information.87  That is, no finding of intent to engage in wrongdoing would 
be necessary.88  This approach involves a substantially reduced burden of 
                                                                                                                   
 82 Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/in 
sider.htm (last modified Apr. 19, 2001). 
 83 See Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 
75 (2002), available at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charvey/Teaching/BA453_2004/B 
D_The_world.pdf (finding the “cost of equity is reduced by roughly 5% . . . if insider trading 
regulations are enforced”).   
 84 Thomas C. Pearson, When Hedge Funds Betray a Creditor Committee’s Fiduciary Role: 
New Twists on Insider Trading in the International Financial Markets, 28 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 165, 212 (2008) (noting the lack of international enforcement of securities laws, 
including insider trading regulations). 
 85 REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002, U.S. SEC. 
& EXCHANGE COMM’N 4 (Jan. 24, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf. 
 86 See Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 573, 
639–40. 
 87 See Karen Schoen, Insider Trading: The “Possession Versus Use” Debate, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 239, 249–57, 278–85 (1999) (finding strong support for the “having possession” 
standard in U.S. case law). 
 88 See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining the SEC’s argument 
that simple knowing possession of insider information would carry liability). 
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proof, albeit coupled with a light sanction in the form of simple 
disgorgement, absent aggravating circumstances.89  Presumably, this 
approach would result in more certain instances of “prosecution” of insider 
trading, albeit with light penalties, which may be preferable to fewer 
prosecutions albeit with heavy penalties.  The bottom line is that securities 
authorities should identify the most cost-effective approach to reducing the 
incidence of insider trading by creating the perception and reality that insider 
trading is not profitable. 
3.  Pyramid and Ponzi Schemes  
A pyramid or Ponzi scheme arises any time new investor funds are used 
to pay old investors.90  The pretense is that the returns are from a real 
investment, when there have been no such returns and often no such 
investment.91  Pyramid schemes are always and inevitably destined to 
collapse, resulting in nearly complete losses to a vast majority of the 
investors.92  They are frauds by definition.93  Pyramid schemes are most 
often perpetrated by unregulated persons,94 but increasingly authorities must 
be vigilant to ensure that regulated persons, particularly those facing 
financial difficulties, are not operating pyramid schemes such as that 
perpetrated by Bernard Madoff.     
Numerous jurisdictions have had, and continue to have, their share of 
problems with pyramid schemes.  Pyramid schemes brought the government 
of Albania to its knees in 1997;95 the MMM Investment scheme in Russia 
lost $1.5 billion in the 1990s;96 unregistered fraudulent offerings (UFOs) 
plagued Jamaica’s financial markets culminating in the Jamaica Financial 
                                                                                                                   
 89 See id. at 1337–38 (finding that a law giving the SEC the right to receive treble damages 
in a civil case for insider trading suggested the knowing possession standard was 
inappropriate). 
 90 See Clarence L. Pozza, Jr. et al., A Review of Recent Investor Issues in the Madoff, 
Stanford and Forte Ponzi Scheme Cases, 10 J. BUS. SEC. L. 113, 116–17 (2010). 
 91 Id. 
 92 R. Alexander Pilmer & Mark T. Cramer, Swindler’s List, L.A. LAW., June 2009, at 22, 24 
(“[T]he ultimate failure of a Ponzi Scheme is certain.”). 
 93 See Pozza et al., supra note 90, at 116. 
 94 See Sergio Pareja, Sales Gone Wild: Will the FTC’s Business Opportunity Rule Put an 
End to Pyramid Marketing Schemes?, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 83, 87–88 (2008). 
 95 See Celestine Bohlen, In a Poor Land, a Classic Swindle Leaves Rage and Emptier 
Pockets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at A5. 
 96 See William R. White, Note, Taming the Markets—The New Russian Securities Law and 
the Protection of Shareholder Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 125, 141–42 (1998). 
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Services Authority’s shut down of Olint Investment in 2006;97 Colombia 
declared a state of emergency in 2008 after the collapse of a large Ponzi 
scheme;98 Nigeria struggles with hundreds of “wonder banks”;99 and Bernard 
Madoff managed to conduct a long running and enormously destructive 
pyramid scheme in the United States.100  One would think that both 
perpetrators and investors would have learned their lesson from the Madoff 
matter, but the SEC has shut down nearly 100 Ponzi schemes since 
Madoff.101  They can only be addressed through eternal vigilance and strong 
enforcement. 
The most important government response to any pyramid scheme is to 
shut it down by injunctive orders and asset restraints as soon as it is 
detected.102  Every day that a pyramid scheme is allowed to continue results 
in more damage and losses to investors.   
The issue often arises as to why a securities authority, as opposed to a 
banking authority or criminal authorities, should be responsible for shutting 
down pyramid schemes.103  Pyramid schemes are not just “deposit taking” 
enterprises as they may purport to be.104  Many offer securities, at least 
within the definition of security under U.S. law,105 typically in the form of an 
“investment contract.”106  Since the SEC has jurisdiction to pursue fraud in 
                                                                                                                   
 97 See Olint Boss Pleads Guilty, Sent to Prison in TCI, JAMAICAN OBSERVER, Sept. 24, 
2010; Julian Richardson, Olin Anger, JAMAICAN OBSERVER, Feb. 9, 2010. 
 98 Carlos Fradique-Méndez, The Recent Evolution of Columbia’s Financial Market, 
ASPATORE, Aug. 2009, at 4, available at 2009 WL 2511991. 
 99 Ismail Mudashir, Kaduna – Storm Over “Wonder Banks,” DAILY TR. (Nig.) (Sept. 6, 2010), 
http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2271:kaduna-s 
torm-over-wonder-banks&catid=24:star-feature&Itemid=208; Resurgence of “Wonder Banks,” 
DAILY TR. (Nig.) (July 16, 2010), http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content 
&view=article &id=85:resurgence-of-wonder-banks&catid=17:editorial&Itemid=9. 
 100 Christine Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative): Bernard Madoff, 2009 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 951–58. 
 101 Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, My First 100 Days as Director of 
Enforcement, Remarks Before the New York City Bar (Aug. 5, 2009), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm (noting that over forty Ponzi scheme 
investigations began during Mr. Khuzami’s first 100 days). 
 102 C.R. Bowles, Jr. et al., Dirty Rotten Scoundrels: Ponzi Schemes in Bankruptcy Cases, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 28 (Mar. 28, 2009). 
 103 Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 403–04 (2010). 
 104 See infra note 106. 
 105 See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2011), Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(10) (West 2011). 
 106 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (defining investment contract as a 
security); see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63–64 (1990) (crafting a four factor 
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the purchase and sale of any security,107 the SEC has jurisdiction over 
pyramid schemes,108 and has shut down hundreds of them in the last several 
years.  Securities authorities, central banks, and criminal authorities must 
ensure that there are cooperative mechanisms in place to deal quickly and 
effectively with pyramid schemes.109  If the securities authority is to assume 
an increasing, or primary role, then it should evaluate whether it needs legal 
amendments to broaden the definition of a “security.”  It will also need the 
investigative and prosecutorial tools described throughout this Article. 
C.  Step 3: Empower the Capital Market Authority with Comprehensive 
Compulsory Investigative Authority   
A modern capital market authority must have, and routinely use, full 
compulsory authority to require production of any information, from any 
person, that is relevant to conducting a complete and thorough 
investigation.110  Investigators must have the tools to follow the facts 
wherever they may lead.111  The essential importance of this broad 
                                                                                                                   
“family resemblance” test for determining whether a “note” is a security). 
 107 Reves, 494 U.S. at 61. 
 108 Mark Frederick Hoffman, Note, Decreasing the Costs of Jurisdictional Gridlock: Merger of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 28 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 682 (1995). 
 109 For another set of proffered reforms, see Barnard, supra note 103. 
 110 See generally 15 U.S.C. 78u(a)(1) (West 2011); SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 
F.2d 1371, 1375 (2d Cir. 1970).  Model statutory language providing such authority could 
read as follows: 
The securities authority may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it 
deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, 
or is about to violate any provision of the Securities Laws, the rules or 
regulations thereunder.  The securities authority is authorized in its 
discretion, to investigate any facts, practices, or matters which it may deem 
necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of such provisions, in the 
prescribing of rules and regulations under this law, or in securing information 
to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation concerning the 
matters to which this law relates. 
 111 See generally Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 21(b) (West 2011).  
Model statutory language could read as follows: 
For the purpose of any investigation, or any other proceeding under this law, 
any member of the securities authority, or any officer designated by it, is 
empowered to administer oaths, summon witnesses, take statements and other 
testimonial evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, 
correspondence, memoranda, or other records (whether paper or electronic) 
which the securities authority deems relevant or material to the investigation 
or proceeding.  
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compulsory authority cannot be overstressed.  Fraudsters manipulate markets 
using their laptop computers.  Insider traders pass information through email, 
phone calls and text messages.  Securities frauds often involve secreting 
illegal proceeds through the banking system, often in accounts held by 
corporations or trusts, necessitating routine access to bank records and other 
beneficial ownership information.  Even regulated persons, such as brokers 
and their affiliates, use third parties and personal communication devices to 
perpetrate their schemes.  Witnesses’ testimony is also an essential 
component of building the evidentiary record to successfully stop market 
fraud.  These are just a few examples of the wide range of information that 
must be accessible by a modern securities authority through compulsory 
process if they are to effectively police their market and protect investors.  
Moreover, this authority must be backed up by criminal penalties for refusal 
to produce evidence, destruction of or tampering with evidence, and for lying 
to examiners and investigators.112  
1.  Why the Ability to Obtain Bank Records Is Essential for Securities 
Authorities 
Securities fraud is always motivated by money.  Routine access to bank 
records is essential to successfully pursue market manipulation and insider 
trading cases because the movement of money through bank accounts is a 
primary source of evidence connecting parties to a fraudulent scheme, as 
well as to each other.  The ability to easily obtain bank records is a core 
international standard, recognized in the IOSCO Principles,113 and is a 
requirement of the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
                                                                                                                   
 112 See generally id. § 78u(c) (providing for criminal penalties for refusal to obey an SEC 
subpoena for documents or testimony).  Statutory language providing for such penalties could 
read substantially similar to the following: 
In case of refusal to obey a securities authority summons issued to any 
person, the securities authority may invoke the aid of the appropriate court or 
tribunal to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the 
production of books, papers, correspondence, and other records.  Such court 
or tribunal may issue an order requiring such person to appear before the 
securities authority or any member or officer designated by the securities 
authority, to produce records or to give statements or testimony relating to the 
matter under investigation.  Any failure to obey such order of the court may 
be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. 
 113 IOSCO, supra note 63, at 6. 
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(MMOU).114  The U.S. SEC routinely seeks bank records in its securities 
fraud investigations. 
Securities authorities must set up strict guidelines for its staff as to how to 
request and handle bank records.  The request must be made in the course of 
a legitimate investigation and the information must be held confidential.115  
Misuse of bank records and other non-public information by staff or officials 
should be an offense punishable by termination and/or prosecution.  This 
being said, the securities authority should resist any effort requiring 
permission of a court or of the banking authorities before obtaining bank 
records.  If every routine request for bank records required a judicial hearing, 
the resulting delay often would be prejudicial to an investigation.  Similarly, 
requiring approval from the banking authorities would diminish the 
independence of the securities authorities and would allow the banking 
authorities to exert potentially inappropriate influence over securities 
investigations. 
  a.  A Note on Customer Notification 
Securities authorities seek bank records in investigations because the staff 
is trying to determine whether the account holder has committed securities 
fraud or whether the proceeds are in an account that they control.  Some 
securities authorities have anti-tipping provisions, as do most financial 
intelligence units.116  Unfortunately, in the U.S. the Right to Financial 
Privacy Act (RFPA) mandates that the SEC give notice to the customer and 
an opportunity to object (which objection is rarely successful).117  This notice 
carries the danger that it will tip off a fraudster that an SEC investigation is 
ongoing, often sooner than the staff would prefer to surface in an 
                                                                                                                   
 114 Int’l Org. of Sec. Commissions (IOSCO), Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding, 
art. 7(b)(ii) (May 2002) [hereinafter IOSCO MMOU], available at http://www.iosco.org/libra 
ry/pubdocs/pdf/ioscopd126.pdf.  
 115 For example, the U.S. SEC uses standard forms that are provided to every witness 
requested or compelled to provide information.  These forms explain the rights of the parties 
and the routine uses to which the information provided may be used, including use in 
enforcement actions or in cooperation with domestic or foreign authorities.  See 
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR PERSONS REQUESTED TO SUPPLY INFORMATION 
VOLUNTARILY OR DIRECTED TO SUPPLY INFORMATION PURSUANT TO A COMMISSION SUBPOENA 
(FORM 1662) (Sept. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/sec1662.pdf. 
 116 See Financial Action Task Force, FAFT 40 Recommendations, at 5 (Oct. 2003), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.PDF. 
 117 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3404 (West 2011) [hereinafter 
RFPA], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/priv.pdf. 
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investigation.  If staff is investigating someone for financial fraud, the last 
thing they want to do is to notify the person that they are seeking bank 
records before having a chance to look at those records to determine whether 
the person has other accounts that may be used to hide the proceeds of fraud.  
Laws like the RFPA that require law enforcement authorities investigating 
financial fraud to provide customer notice and an opportunity to protest 
access to their financial records are an unnecessary and inappropriate 
impediment to law enforcement.118  As one of my colleagues so eloquently 
put the issue:  
While privacy concerns are of profound significance and must 
be accorded their proper sway, nonetheless so too is it also of 
profound social significance that fraudsters do not dominate the 
capital markets, destroy other people’s hard earned wealth and, 
indeed, reduce the level of economic growth through their 
malfeasance and thievery.119 
Foreign authorities should fight hard for anti-tipping provisions to ensure 
that they may conduct and complete their investigations without undue 
interference or delay. 
2.  Why Access to Telephone Records, Emails, Internet Service Provider 
Records, and Other Forms of Electronic Communications Are Essential for 
Securities Authorities 
Securities authorities must have the authority to compel production of 
telephone records if they want to adequately police insider trading and 
market manipulation.  These records can establish whether two parties knew 
each other and had conversations at key times during an event relevant to the 
investigation.120  This is typically the key evidence necessary to prove insider 
                                                                                                                   
 118 While there is a provision in the RFPA that a court order may be sought for a temporary 
exemption from the notice requirement, id. § 3409, it creates substantial delay and burden to 
require investigatory staff in the heat of juggling multiple investigations to go to court to 
complete their investigations.   
 119 Dr. Robert M. Fisher, Deputy Dir., Office of Int’l Affairs, U.S. SEC. 
 120 Telephone records are not transcripts of telephone conversations.  Rather, these are 
records that show the date and time telephone calls are placed; the numbers called; the 
duration of the calls; and subscriber information, such as the name, address, and payment 
information of the owner of the telephone number.   
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trading and market manipulation cases.121  The U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals noted that “[t]he temporal proximity of a phone conversation 
between the trader and one with insider knowledge provides a reasonable 
basis for inferring that the basis of the trader’s belief was the inside 
information.”122  I estimate that phone records are relied on in well over half 
of SEC’s successful insider trading prosecutions.  As a corollary, I would 
assume that the inability to obtain phone records probably reduces a 
securities authority’s ability to investigate successfully and prosecute insider 
trading by at least half. 
Securities authorities must also have the authority to obtain emails, hard 
drives, and ISP records.  With the ever-increasing use of electronic 
communications and web-based marketing and information distribution 
tools, the ability to obtain email communications and ISP records, which can 
provide the name, address, and billing information for subscribers to email 
accounts or web pages, is increasingly important for effective securities 
investigations.  This is most recently illustrated by the U.S. SEC enforcement 
action against two Canadians who used Facebook, Twitter, and their website 
to allegedly manipulate stocks.123  Accordingly, as with telephone records, 
securities commissions should actively pursue the statutory authority to 
obtain email, ISP records, and other electronic communications.  
3.  Why Compulsory Witness Statements? 
Witness statements play a critical role in an investigation.  Securities 
authorities must have the authority to compel witnesses, including non-
regulated persons, to appear and testify before their staff in the course of an 
investigation.  There must also be consequences for lying to the staff.124 
                                                                                                                   
 121 L. HILTON FOSTER, INSIDER TRADING INVESTIGATIONS 3 (2000) (“Telephone records 
frequently provide this circumstantial evidence in ‘tipping’ cases.”), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_enforce/foster.pdf. 
 122 SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 123 See Press Release, SEC, Court Enters Default Judgments of Permanent Injunction and 
Other Relief Against Defendants Carol McKeown, Daniel F. Ryan and Their Companies 
Downshire Capital Inc. and Meadow Vista Financial Corp. (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21847.htm. 
 124 See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Teresa Fernandez Sentenced to 41 Months in Prison for 
Making False Statements to the SEC and Probation Officers (Jan. 27, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19545.htm. 
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D.  Step 4: Empower the Securities Authority with Efficient, Effective, and 
Flexible Civil Remedies   
A capital market’s regulator should be empowered with a broad range of 
remedies at its disposal that are designed to protect investors, deter illegal 
conduct, and remediate market abuses.  A broad range of remedies enables a 
regulator to tailor each specific remedy to the particular abuse that is being 
addressed.   
A number of countries have attempted to build up a criminal response to 
market frauds at the expense of civil enforcement programs.  This is the 
wrong approach and unsustainable.  The criminal process is not well suited 
to take the lead role in dealing with most securities law violations.  
Prosecutors are busy and securities cases are complex.  The criminal process 
takes enormous resources, and the conviction rate for securities fraud all over 
the world is very low because the criminal burden of proof—beyond a 
reasonable doubt—is difficult to meet.125  Criminal cases, and the moral 
stigma they represent, should be reserved for the most egregious cases—the 
premeditated frauds that result in the destruction of life savings and that 
involve market-destroying conduct.  Where this line is drawn in any 
particular case will depend on many factors, but, in my view, no more than 
10% of securities law violations in a market need be dealt with criminally.126     
In contrast, civil tools are much more flexible, efficient, certain, and 
effective at stopping and remedying securities fraud and market abuse.127  A 
                                                                                                                   
 125 See, e.g., Regina F. Burch, “Unfit to Serve” Post-Enron, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1081, 1085 
(2008) (“[U.S.] [f]ederal criminal trials for violations of federal securities laws are lengthy, 
involve large resource expenditures by government prosecutors, require sifting through 
thousands of pages of corporate documents, and involve many corporate employees and other 
individuals.  [The government] must show that the defendant acted willfully or knowingly and 
must establish its case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 126 For example, in many jurisdictions, insider trading can only be prosecuted criminally, 
which means that the securities authority refers the matter to criminal authorities for 
prosecution.  Now, while insider trading is always bad for markets, there is a long continuum 
of behavior involved.  For example, a CEO may reveal inside information to his barber while 
getting a haircut; the barber just cannot resist the good fortune that has fallen into his lap, and 
he goes out and trades.  On the other hand, there are the investment bankers working on 
mergers deals who are sworn to secrecy and sign agreements not to trade, yet they abuse their 
professional positions by secretly trading through overseas accounts held by nominee-owned 
corporations that they secretly control.  In my view, criminal resources are best spent on the 
latter situation.   
 127 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 contains a remarkably flexible provision 
that says that “the [SEC] may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that 
may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”  15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(5) (West 
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comprehensive range of remedies includes: trading suspensions, 
disgorgement of illegal profits, officer and director bars, civil monetary 
penalties, injunctive orders to stop present and future violations, appointment 
of a corporate monitor or receiver, and asset freezes.  These remedies can be 
mixed, matched, and tailored to neatly fit the specific violation.  Civil 
injunctive actions can also be backed by the court’s authority to enforce its 
orders, including incarceration for contempt, ensuring that these orders have 
teeth.128  
Moreover, the prophylactic and deterrent effect of public exposure of 
wrongdoing should not be underestimated, particularly in an industry that 
thrives on reputation.  Indeed, this is a leverage point that the securities 
authority should fully exploit.  Enforcement actions should serve as a forum 
to send a message by exposing the wrongdoer and explaining the nature of 
the violation, the harm caused, and the remedial action being taken to correct 
the problem to protect investors and the market.   
The U.S. has developed what is characterized as a “parallel” system, 
whereby the SEC can prosecute a case civilly without precluding a parallel 
criminal case by the Department of Justice for the same conduct.129  Many 
have questioned why this parallel system does not result in a constitutional 
double jeopardy violation.  However, the system has survived judicial 
scrutiny because the agency’s penalties and other relief are designed to be 
remedial in nature, and not punishment for double jeopardy purposes.130   
                                                                                                                   
2011). 
 128 See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Sec Files Second Contempt Motion Against Roc Hatfield 
and Global Diamond Fund, Inc. (Sept. 26, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/li 
treleases/lr17747.htm (describing the SEC’s contempt action for failure to file a sworn 
accounting that had been ordered by the judge). 
 129 See Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enforcement, and Ira L. Brandriss, Staff 
Attorney, Div. of Enforcement, SEC, The Advantages of a Dual System: Parallel Streams of 
Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Laws, Remarks at the 16th 
International Symposium on Economic Crime (Sept. 19, 1998) (remarking on the advantages 
offered by the U.S. system of both civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch222.htm.  
 130 See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 105 (1997) (holding that the federal government’s 
administrative proceedings imposing monetary penalties against petitioners for violations of 
banking statutes did not bar the subsequent criminal proceedings for the same conduct because 
the administrative proceedings were civil actions for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause). 
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1.  Disgorging Illegal Proceeds of Securities Fraud: Show Me the Money! 
Securities frauds are financial crimes and, as such, are all about the 
money.  Securities frauds are particularly tempting because people can 
quickly make millions of dollars with well-timed insider trading, by 
participating in a scheme to pump up stock prices while secretly selling into 
the hype, or by looting their company through undisclosed deals with 
secretly controlled companies.  Indeed, numerous SEC enforcement actions 
involve securities fraudsters who have funded their “lavish lifestyles” with 
ill-gotten investors’ funds.131  The temptation is high, the opportunities 
abound, and the payoff is large.  Securities authorities must be empowered to 
remove these profits or the frauds will continue. 
Remedies that focus on removing the profit incentive through 
disgorgement and penalties are extremely effective in reducing and deterring 
financial crime.132  If we could disgorge all proceeds of securities fraud, we 
would eliminate fraud and misconduct from our markets.  Confiscation of all 
profits made from financial crime should be certain, automatic, and the 
minimum sanction available. 
Under no circumstances should an individual be permitted to keep the 
proceeds of his securities law violation.  Examples of disgorgement in the 
context of various securities frauds would include: 
●  Financial Fraud: officer’s bonus, stock options, salaries 
where company financial results have been 
misrepresented, and trading profits;  
●  Offering Fraud: money misappropriated from the investor 
funds raised; 
●  Broker Dealer Fraud: commissions earned on fraudulent 
transactions; 
●  Insider Trading: profits made or losses avoided from 
insider trading; and 
●  Manipulation: profits from manipulative trading and sales. 
                                                                                                                   
 131 Search SEC Documents, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/search/se 
arch.htm (search “lavish lifestyle”) (last modified July 30, 2009). 
 132 See Rules on Fair Fund and Disgorgement Plans, 17 C.F.R. § 201.1100 (2006), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/about/rulesprac2006.pdf (stating SEC disgorgement rules relating to 
enforcement actions). 
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2.  Penalties  
Penalties are defined as the fines assessed above and beyond the profits 
made by the wrongdoer.133  If all the profits from market abuse and fraud 
were disgorged in every instance of fraud, the incentive for such fraud and 
abuse would be eliminated.  It is because we cannot detect and prosecute 
every instance of fraud and abuse that we need penalties in addition to 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains to serve as a deterrent.  Penalties should 
have some meaningful correlation to the amount of the gain made from the 
fraud and should be adjusted based on other factors, such as the harm to the 
market, harm to investors, willfulness of the fraud, recidivism, the need to 
create additional deterrence for the particular conduct, and other traditional 
factors for assessing penalties.  For example, if a person makes $1 million 
from insider trading, and there is a one in four chance of catching that 
person, then the penalty to achieve optimal deterrence (i.e., to ensure that 
wrongdoing does not “pay” on average) should be $3 million, for a total 
payment (disgorgement and penalty) of $4 million.  Countries should be 
careful about laws that provide a fixed amount of penalties for certain 
violations, as the specified amount can quickly become obsolete and 
represent a mere cost of business for the fraudster.   
E.  Step 5: Securities Authorities Need to Develop a Partnership with 
Criminal Authorities 
While I have argued that the vast majority of securities law violations can 
and should be handled by a non-criminal process, there are always some 
securities frauds that are so damaging to innocent investors’ lives, so 
destructive to the market, and so calculated to steal from others, that the 
perpetrators should go to jail.  Securities law violations may also be 
associated with other crimes, such as money laundering, mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and conspiracy.  This means the securities authority should develop a 
good working relationship with the Attorney General or other criminal 
authority to help ensure that the most egregious securities law violations are 
prosecuted.134   
                                                                                                                   
 133 See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/20 
06-4.htm (explaining the SEC’s position concerning financial penalties). 
 134 See Newkirk & Brandriss, supra note 129 (discussing best practices in coordinating 
between civil and criminal authorities). 
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F.  Step 6: Securities Authorities Must Have Tools to Engage in Real-Time 
Enforcement 
It is not uncommon for a securities authority to learn of ongoing frauds 
that, if not shut down immediately, can do irreparable harm to investors and 
the market.  These emergency situations can be expected to constitute 3% to 
5% of a securities authority’s case load, if the U.S. SEC’s experience is any 
guide.135  The point is that securities frauds will happen, and the earlier in 
their life cycle they can be detected and stopped, the less damage they will 
do.  The lesson is that the securities authority should have the tools, the 
standing authority, and the capacity to address these emergency situations as 
they arise.   
Some of the more effective emergency tools include injunctive orders,136 
asset freezes, orders preventing destructions of documents, “accountings,”137 
expedited discovery, repatriation orders, and surrender of passports.138  This 
also means that when issuing companies fall below their disclosure or listing 
standards the trading in their stocks may need to cease until they clarify their 
disclosures.  When brokerage firms fall below capital requirements, they 
need to be addressed and resolved immediately.  Leaving insolvent firms 
open creates an environment that is extremely likely to produce fraud and 
Ponzi scheme activity as the firm desperately searches for assets to fill, or 
hide, their capital deficiencies.  Insolvent firms that are allowed to continue 
                                                                                                                   
 135 See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 31 (2010) (noting 3.26% of all enforcement investigations are deemed “high 
impact”), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2010.pdf#mda. 
 136 See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(1) (West 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf.  Legislation providing for injunctive 
orders could read substantially similar to the following: 
Whenever it shall appear to the securities authority that any person is 
engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of 
any provision of the securities laws or regulations thereunder, it may in its 
discretion bring an action in the appropriate court or tribunal to enjoin such 
acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary 
injunction or restraining order shall be granted. 
 137 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 18 (9th ed. 2009) (noting that an “accounting” typically 
involves an order to produce books and records, sworn financial statements, and the location 
of assets). 
 138 For an example of the powerful remedies available in a temporary restraining order, see, 
e.g., Press Release, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission Obtains Emergency Asset 
Freeze Against Additional Defendants Who Purchased Call Options for TXU Corp. Stock 
Prior to Acquisition Announcement (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigatio 
n/litreleases/2007/lr20063.htm. 
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almost invariably lead to trouble, and, in general, should be cleared out of the 
market.  
1.  Asset Freezes 
When a fraud is in progress, it is often essential to get a freeze over all the 
defendant’s assets “wherever they may be located” before the fraudster 
learns of the investigation.  Otherwise the first thing he tends to do is 
dissipate his assets.  To understand the urgency, stocks typically settle in 
three days, which means that after three days the fraudster can wire the 
proceeds to overseas bank accounts in the name of nominee owners, or the 
proceeds will be used to buy diamonds, mansions, cars, or other items to fuel 
their “lavish lifestyle.”139  For these situations, the securities authorities must 
have a means to freeze assets before they are dissipated.   
In the U.S., the SEC must get a court order before it can freeze assets on 
an emergency basis (often without notice to the owner of the assets).  The 
court will issue the order if the SEC can establish a prima facie140 case and a 
strong likelihood that it will prevail at trial on the merits of the case.  The 
SEC must also establish that the defendant, directly or indirectly, has 
engaged in and, unless restrained and enjoined by an order of the court, will 
continue to engage in acts, practices, and courses of business constituting 
violations of the securities laws.141  Should the SEC meet this standard, the 
court will impose a temporary freeze lasting ten days.142  Prior to the 
expiration of the ten days, the court will hold a second hearing to determine 
whether it should maintain the freeze for the duration of the litigation.  The 
SEC must give notice of this hearing to the owner of the assets, who can 
appear and challenge the freeze order.  Unless the owner of the assets can 
persuade the court that the SEC is not likely to succeed on the merits, or that 
the frozen assets are not a reasonable approximation of the proceeds of the 
alleged fraud, the court will issue an order continuing the freeze until after a 
                                                                                                                   
 139 Search SEC Documents, supra note 131. 
 140 Prima facie is Latin for “on its face.”  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1805 (9th ed. 
2009).  A prima facie case is one that at first glance presents sufficient evidence for the 
plaintiff to win.  Id. 
 141 SEC v. Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1998).  These circumstances could include: 
likely and significant dissipation or conversion of assets, significant harm to investors, flight 
from prosecution, destruction of or tampering with evidence, transfer of assets or records 
outside the country, or other immediate and substantial harm to the public interest. 
 142 Id. (“An asset freeze requires a lesser showing; the SEC must establish only that is likely 
to succeed on the merits.”). 
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trial.143  Once the funds are wired out of the country, or otherwise dissipated, 
they are difficult to recover.  Seizing the proceeds of fraud provides 
tremendous leverage over the defendants in financial crimes cases and will 
be a key component in a securities authority’s ability to protect investors and 
the market from securities fraud and abuse.   
2.  Financial Intelligence Units 
Proceeds of securities fraud can be wired around the world at the click of 
a mouse.  Tracing such proceeds through traditional evidence-gathering 
mechanisms, such as memorandum of understanding and mutual legal 
assistance treaties, may take six months to obtain the records, only to find 
that the funds had already been wired off to the next offshore jurisdiction 
five months earlier.  This is no way to conduct investigations in today’s 
world.  Securities fraud is a predicate offense to money laundering, which 
means that any time the proceeds of securities fraud are being secreted away 
through the banking system there is a potential money laundering offense.144   
Increasingly, it makes sense for securities authorities to seek assistance 
from financial intelligence units.145  Many financial intelligence units (FIUs) 
have the capacity to quickly: 
●  identify the beneficial ownership of accounts at issue; 
●  determine whether the funds are still in the account; 
●  work with financial institutions to conduct surveillance 
over accounts and notify appropriate authorities of 
customer attempts to withdraw or remove such funds; and 
●  determine the disposition or destination of any funds that 
have been withdrawn, wired, or moved.146 
                                                                                                                   
 143 See SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that an asset freeze was 
reasonable because of the high risk that funds would be further depleted without the freeze); 
SEC v. ETS Payphones, 408 F.3d 727, 735 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the SEC’s 
approximation of defendant’s “ill-gotten gains” were reasonable and so the freeze could 
continue). 
 144 See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Opening Remarks at Joint Regulatory Anti-
Money Laundering Training (Apr. 23, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2008/spch042308klc.htm. 
 145 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS (2004), available at http:// 
www.apgml.org/issues/docs/19/fiu%20handbook_english.pdf (explaining FIUs and their 
function in market regulation). 
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A number of financial intelligence units also have the capacity to assist 
with obtaining asset restraints either prior to or concurrently with an 
imminent emergency enforcement action.147  FIUs have assisted the U.S. 
SEC in securing millions of dollars in proceeds of fraud located in overseas 
accounts.  Securities authorities and FIUs must continue to develop their 
capacity to work with each other. 
G.  Step 7: Securities Authorities Should Have the Ability to Settle Cases 
Settlements are a valuable tool for building an enforcement program, but 
only in a system where the regulator has sufficient authority to conduct 
thorough investigations and apply meaningful sanctions against the 
wrongdoers, and where it has the reputation for having the will, resources, 
and skill to successfully prosecute the matter if it is not settled.  Specifically, 
wrongdoers must believe that if they do not settle, the securities authority is 
ready and willing to prosecute an enforcement action against them and that it 
will likely be successful in such proceedings.   
Some authorities have expressed distaste for settlements, arguing that 
they represent a compromise of justice.  However, if properly structured, 
settlements can achieve all the goals of an enforcement program.  
Enforcement cases should not be settled unless the terms result in meaningful 
relief that is sufficient to remedy the particular violation, protect investors, 
and have a deterrent effect.  Settlements must also result in penalties and 
other relief that is closely comparable to those that would be obtained if the 
case were litigated.  The bottom line is that, if a settlement does not result in 
the fundamental enforcement goals of deterrence, disgorgement, investor 
protection, industry bars, prevention of ongoing fraud, and improvement of 
investor confidence, then a settlement is counterproductive and should not be 
accepted.  
The settlement process should ensure that settlements result in recourse 
by the securities authority if the defendant breaches the terms.  In the U.S., 
settlements result in a consented court order, and breaches amount to 
contempt of the court’s order, ensuring that settlements have “teeth.”  It 
should be noted here that the higher the quality of the investigation, the 
higher the quality of the settlement, and the better the securities authority can 
deter wrongful conduct and protect investors and the market.  A properly 
                                                                                                                   
 146 See generally id. (outlining the role of FIUs).  
 147 Id. at 14. 
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structured settlement process can be fair and accountable, while allowing the 
securities regulator to take action against the individual or entity, get its 
message out to the public in a meaningful away, and collect penalties and 
fines, while saving valuable public resources in the time and money it would 
take to litigate a case to full completion in the courts.  
The process should allow settlement negotiations at various times in the 
investigation process, with appropriate safeguards to ensure that undue 
pressure is not exerted to extract fines where a violation could not otherwise 
be proven in court.  Most serious settlement discussions should not occur 
until late in the investigative process, ideally after the investigation is 
complete and a preliminary determination has been made about the nature of 
the violations.  This will ensure that settlements are comprehensive and that 
the full evidentiary record and corresponding violations are fully considered 
in reaching the appropriate settlement.  Negotiated settlements should be 
considered and approved or rejected by the securities authority as an 
institutional body, rather than by an individual officer.  Lastly, final 
settlement agreements must be transparent and public.   
H.  Step 8: Capital Markets Must Have Recourse to an Effective Judiciary 
An effective modern financial market must have swift resolution of 
disputes and regulatory enforcement actions, including the ability to grant 
emergency relief to stop ongoing securities frauds.  Capital locked up in 
disputes is not available to grow an economy.  This means that the securities 
authority, and other capital market operators, must have recourse to an 
effective judiciary to ensure that disputes are resolved quickly and 
effectively to help unleash a modern capital market.148 
1.  Specialized Tribunals 
The establishment of a specialized tribunal appears to be an attractive 
option that should be considered by many capital markets.  Traditional court 
systems all too often do not offer a sufficiently timely and efficient 
adjudication mechanism by which the securities authorities, or the securities 
industry, can seek recourse for final resolution of disputes or enforcement 
matters.  Ideally, the tribunal should be empowered to hear not only appeals 
                                                                                                                   
 148 The U.S. SEC uses independent administrative law judges to hear over 50% of its 
enforcement cases.  See Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/alj.shtml (last modified Apr. 19, 2010) (describing the role of that office). 
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from administrative actions and orders by the securities authority but also 
enforcement actions filed by the authority in the first instance.  Preferably, 
the tribunal would have capacity to issue binding injunctive orders, freeze 
assets, issue industry bars, order accountings, and order production of 
documents and testimony.  To grow the market and establish confidence, the 
securities authority must have a tribunal available to it that has capacity to 
remedy the variety of abuses that it will inevitably face as the market grows 
and develops, including prosecutions for insider trading, market 
manipulation, financial accounting and disclosure violations by issuing 
companies, abuse of customers by broker dealers and investment advisors, 
and pyramid schemes.  Indeed, countries should consider a specialized 
tribunal that would have original jurisdiction to hear all capital markets-
related matters, including disputes among investors and brokers and 
disciplinary matters relating to the Exchange, as well as have jurisdiction to 
hear securities authority enforcement proceedings.  This may be particularly 
important given the studies that suggest that private enforcement is also a 
key element in market development.149   
There are a number of models already being employed in various 
countries, and those appear to be working well.  Specialized tribunals are 
efficient and can be set up to resolve cases in well under a year.  The 
expenses of establishing a specialized tribunal are likely far outweighed in 
many markets by the potential dividends toward capital market development.    
I.  Step 9: Securities Authorities Must Have a Robust Compliance and 
Inspection Program  
The securities authority’s examination and inspection program should 
work to reduce the incidence of customer abuse by market intermediaries 
before they become serious violations.  Programs for the inspection of 
broker-dealers, investment advisors, and other regulated persons should be 
separated from the enforcement program.  Inspections are a non-adversarial 
cooperative dialogue with the industry that typically result in nonpublic 
deficiency letters;150 whereas an enforcement program is adversarial, 
                                                                                                                   
 149 See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 106 J. POL. ECON. 
1113 (2008) (exploring the regulation of self-dealing on market development, primarily 
through private enforcement mechanisms to prevent diversion of corporate wealth from 
investors to management).  
 150 A deficiency letter is provided by the regulator to the firm and identifies the problems, asks 
the registrant to take remedial steps, and requests that the registrant provide a written response.   
578  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 39:535 
 
 
compulsory and results in public enforcement actions.  This “good cop — 
bad cop” system has numerous advantages that mutually reinforce each 
other. 
A securities regulator should have a competent staff of examiners that are 
well-trained to perform complete, comprehensive, and discreet examinations 
of all market participants.  Unlike many other functions of the regulator, the 
examinations of market participants, and resulting examination reports, 
should be confidential.  Problems and deficiencies identified within firms 
should be handled informally where possible, but securities examiners 
should have authority to and not hesitate to refer the most serious securities 
law violations found during examinations to enforcement staff where 
appropriate. 
1.  Compliance Programs 
One powerful way a securities authority can cultivate a culture of 
compliance is to mandate an industry compliance program that requires firms 
to establish a Chief Compliance Officer, compliance policies and procedures, 
an annual self-assessment, access for the Chief Compliance Officer to the 
firm’s senior-level executives, and internal codes of ethics.151  The regulator 
can build a hierarchy whereby the individual firms are responsible for their 
own representatives, the self-regulatory organizations are responsible for 
their own firms, and the regulator oversees the entire structure.  Such a 
regime can be strongly reinforced by an enforcement program.  For example, 
a securities authority may sanction not only individual representatives for 
recommending unsuitable investments, but also the employing firms for 
failure to supervise their employees.  “Failure to supervise” cases send a 
strong message to the firms that they are responsible for having effective 
compliance programs that will avoid, deter, and detect improprieties by their 
employees and that they will be held accountable for deficiencies in such 
programs.  One solid enforcement case against a brokerage firm for a 
compliance failure, or “failure to supervise,” will send a message to every 
other firm in the market that, if the firm allows such conduct to happen on its 
watch, it will be held accountable.  Notably, an affirmative defense in these 
                                                                                                                   
See EXAMINATIONS BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE 
INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N 24 (2011), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/ocieoverview.pdf (describing its examination process). 
 151 For an excellent article by the architect of such a program, see John H. Walsh, 
Institution-Based Financial Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381 (2008).    
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cases is having a compliance program that is reasonably designed to detect 
and remedy the wrongdoing.  This serves to empower compliance officers, as 
well as examiners, with the clout they need to insist on changes in a firm’s 
conduct, culture, and procedure. 
Morality has been defined as what a person does when nobody else is 
looking.  While a majority of people do not seek to unfairly profit at the 
expense of others, there will always be a minority that will abuse the system.  
The challenge for a securities authority is to create a transparent environment 
where the perception is that everyone is looking—compliance officers, 
investors, regulatory authorities, examiners, lawyers, accountants, and other 
gatekeepers.   
J.  Step 10: Securities Authorities Must Develop a Partnership with the 
Industry: The Self-Regulatory Model and Other Incentives to Cooperate with 
the Government 
Unfortunately, numerous securities authorities have not established an 
effective partnership with their industry for sharing the burden associated 
with monitoring, compliance, supervision, and disciplinary actions.  The 
government’s role is to ensure that the private sector thrives, and the private 
sector should have every incentive to partner with the government in taking 
the necessary steps toward this goal.  Those in the private sector that are 
taking the long-term view will support a fully empowered securities 
authority with a vigorous enforcement program for this is no threat to 
legitimate business.  On the contrary, it is designed to protect and grow the 
markets.  The securities authority should watch for every opportunity to 
leverage the resources and self-interest of the industry to the maximum 
extent possible to be a partner in policing the securities market.  The 
regulatory structure should be characterized by a working partnership with 
the industry at every level possible, albeit at “arms length” to avoid 
“regulatory capture.”   
1.  Self-Regulatory Organization Structure 
Self-regulatory structures are highly efficient and work well where the 
regulator has full authority to require the industry to police its own members, 
conduct surveillance, and report and remedy fraud and abuse.  Self-
regulatory organizations (SROs) are well-positioned to assume this role 
because they are able to exercise “contractual” control over their 
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membership.  Requiring the industry to police itself also conserves 
substantial public resources.  The SRO’s ability to revoke membership is an 
extraordinarily effective, albeit non-governmental tool that provides leverage 
for ensuring that members follow the rules.  Remarkably, in the U.S., SROs 
conduct about twice as many examinations and enforcement actions as the 
SEC.  Absent this division of labor, the SEC would likely need to triple its 
staff and budget.  This approach takes a huge burden off of the public 
resources of a securities authority and frees it up to assume a more 
appropriate role as an “APEX” regulator.  Delegated authority, however, also 
must come with responsibility and accountability.  Moreover, if the SRO 
does not adequately carry out its responsibilities, the securities authority 
must use its enforcement powers to correct the situation.152  As they say:  
“trust, but verify.” 
Securities regulators may also seek to cultivate a culture of cooperation 
within the industry.  Again, this is often accomplished by appealing to the 
industry’s self-interest.  The securities authority may want to consider 
implementing a package of incentives to regulated persons for self-policing, 
self-remediating, and cooperating with investigations.  This program can 
include both intermediaries and stock-issuing companies, as well as 
whistleblowers and others that come forward with actionable information.153  
Simply put, if a regulated person or other “gatekeeper” cooperates with an 
investigation they may be provided with corresponding favorable treatment 
in the form of lower penalties in any enforcement cases that the securities 
authority may ultimately bring.  Likewise, failure to cooperate may result in 
correspondingly higher penalties and other sanctions.  Industry cooperation 
with inspections and investigations can substantially improve the 
responsiveness and capacity of the securities authority’s enforcement 
program.  All credit for cooperation should be transparent and approved by 
                                                                                                                   
 152 See, e.g., Sodano, Case No. 3-12596 (SEC Mar. 22, 2007), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-55509-o.pdf (discussing charges against CEO of American Stock 
Exchange for inadequate surveillance, investigatory, enforcement, and compliance programs). 
 153 The U.S. SEC has published a list of considerations to help educate the industry about the 
benefits of cooperating, and the corresponding penalties for lack of cooperation.  See Report 
of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) & the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency 
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44969 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm.  This program has worked well and 
companies coming forward to self-report problems in their organization is a significant source 
of enforcement cases.  See also Enforcement Cooperation Initiative, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enfcoopinitiative.shtml (last modified 
Nov. 2, 2011) (describing a series of measures to encourage cooperation by both individuals 
and companies with SEC investigations and enforcement actions).  
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the securities authority as an institutional body to ensure consistency with 
programmatic goals and avoid unfair preferential treatment. 
K.  Step 11: The Securities Authority Must Maximize Its Capacity to Engage 
in International Cooperation 
With the globalization of capital markets, securities authorities must have 
capacity to work with international regulatory and law enforcement partners 
to protect their market and investors, and to provide reciprocal assistance 
when requested.  The capacity of a securities authority to protect its market is 
increasingly dependent on the quality of regulatory authorities in other 
markets.  Securities fraud and abuse is not constrained by geographic 
borders, but the authority of a securities authority ends at the border.  Market 
abuses that damage investors can originate from anywhere in the world, and 
domestic market abuses often involve the proceeds of the scheme being 
wired outside of the country.  International boiler rooms154 and pyramid 
schemes are examples that further illustrate this point.  These international 
frauds involve unscrupulous salesmen that sell securities from one 
jurisdiction, often where there is lax enforcement.  They sell securities from 
companies from a second jurisdiction.  The victims are in a third set of 
jurisdictions, who wire their funds to offshore accounts in a fourth set of 
jurisdictions, and the whole scheme is masterminded by fraudsters who could 
be located anywhere.  Unsuspecting investors, often vulnerable and elderly, 
are devastated daily by these frauds.  These are truly international schemes 
designed to exploit the jurisdictional limitations of law enforcement that will 
require new international techniques and cooperation. 
The IOSCO MMOU is a magnificent achievement in international 
enforcement cooperation.  The MMOU provides a standardized framework 
for sharing enforcement-related information and a gradually expanding 
network of participating regulatory agencies.155  Approximately eighty 
countries are now signatories,156 many after working to obtain the legislative 
                                                                                                                   
 154 See generally Boiler Room, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answe 
rs/boiler.htm (last modified May 25, 2000) (describing boiler room frauds). 
 155 See Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and 
Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMoU), OICU-IOSCO, http://www.iosco. 
org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_main (last visited Aug. 20, 2011) (featuring the text of 
MMOU). 
 156 See List of Signatories to the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information – 80, OICU-
IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_siglist (last visited Aug. 20, 
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capacity to compel bank records and other beneficial ownership information 
and to share the information with their counterparts.157  The MMOU allows 
its signatories to help each other properly police their securities markets and 
shut down international frauds that may adversely affect capital markets and 
their investors, creating a seamless enforcement network among its 
membership.   
As great as the IOSCO MMOU is, however, it is only the beginning.  
First, international agreements to cooperate are only as effective as the 
regulatory authorities who must give them effect, and many still lack basic 
powers.  Second, as discussed throughout this Article, securities authorities 
cannot properly police their markets without access to phone records, ISP 
records, emails, hard-drives, testimony, asset freezes, and provisions for 
enforcement of judgments, none of which are mandated in the MMOU.  The 
U.K. courts have recently rendered an extraordinarily helpful decision to 
facilitate an international freeze order and international enforcement of 
judgment.158  Someday, these issues will also need to be comprehensively 
addressed by the IOSCO community.  Until that time, securities fraudsters 
will continue to exploit the gaps in international cooperation.   
L.  Step 12: Securities Authorities Must Develop Surveillance and 
Intelligence Capacity 
There are many sources that a securities authority should cultivate to 
ensure that it receives timely intelligence on market conditions, including 
fraud and abuse.  These will include customer complaints, market 
surveillance programs, examinations of market intermediaries, referrals from 
other domestic and foreign authorities, whistleblowers, and the financial 
                                                                                                                   
2011). 
 157 See generally International Enforcement Assistance, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_crossborder.shtml (last modified Jan. 20, 2010) 
(explaining memorandum of understanding and mutual legal assistance treaties and their 
current roles in the SEC regulation framework). 
 158 The High Court of Justice in London issued an order freezing assets held in the United 
Kingdom by a citizen of the United Kingdom who was a defendant in a pending SEC 
enforcement action in the United States.  U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission v. 
Manterfield, (2008) EWHC 1349 (QB), available at 2008 WL 3819582.  The Manterfield 
case is summarized in an SEC Press Release.  Press Release, SEC, Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Lydia Capital, LLC et al. & United Kingdom Court of Appeal Upholds SEC 
Asset Freeze Order Against Defendant in SEC Case Alleging Fraud by a Hedge Fund 
Manager (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20872.htm.  
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press.  Securities authorities must have a comprehensive system for intake, 
analysis, and tracking of surveillance, complaints, tips, and referrals.    
A computerized automated surveillance program is essential for most 
modern capital markets to detect market manipulation and insider trading.  
The surveillance systems are typically located at the securities authority, 
stock exchange, or both.  The general concept is fairly simple: the program 
must detect unusual trading spikes in either volume or price in a particular 
security.  Then, public records need to be checked to see if the trading was in 
advance of significant corporate announcements (typically these include 
mergers, acquisitions, product development, earnings announcements, or 
regulatory approvals).  If so, this generates an alert indicating possible 
insider trading that should be investigated.  The investigator must determine 
whether the persons trading have an explanation for their unusual trading 
other than that they possessed non-public material information.   In market 
manipulation cases, the surveillance will also seek to identify unusual trading 
spikes, but, unlike insider trading, there may not be any public 
announcement or other press that would otherwise explain the anomalous 
trading. 
The stock exchanges should be in regular contact with securities 
authorities to discuss alerts or sudden movements and make appropriate and 
timely referrals of suspicious trading.   The securities authority must ensure 
that the exchange is using the proper parameters to obtain the maximum 
efficiency from the electronic surveillance system.   
M.  Step 13: Securities Authorities Should Maintain the Confidentiality of 
Investigations 
The securities authority must maintain the confidentiality of the 
investigative process to protect the integrity of the investigation and the 
privacy and reputation of those being investigated.  Investigations should not 
be construed as an indication of wrongdoing by any person, unless and until 
the investigation is complete and the regulatory authority authorizes the 
filing of charges.  Any concerns about the securities authority’s ability to 
compel information that is private and confidential should be tempered by 
requirements that staff maintain the confidentiality of the information, but 
not by restrictions to the securities authority’s access to the information in 
the first instance.  Once an enforcement proceeding commences, the 
authority should notify the public of the charges, the violations involved, and 
the regulator’s rationale for bringing the action. 
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N.  Step 14: Securities Authorities Should Serve As the “Investor’s 
Advocate” 
William O. Douglas, the U.S. SEC’s third Chairman from 1937–1939 and 
the longest serving U.S. Supreme Court Justice, said that the SEC is the 
“investor’s advocate.”159  This philosophy has been the bedrock that has seen 
the SEC through seventy-five years of market growth and innovation, and it 
is a primary reason that nearly 60% of U.S. households are confident enough 
to invest their retirements and children’s education in the capital markets.  
These are productive assets available to build and rebuild the economy.  The 
regulatory structure must be designed to protect their interests and give them 
the confidence that their funds are not going to be stolen, that the books are 
accurate, and that the system is not rife with insider traders and market 
manipulators.  Investors will assume the risk of business and economic 
cycles, but they will not readily assume the risk that their investment will be 
stolen or diminished by securities fraud.  Being the investor’s advocate 
means that the individual investor, not the large industry firms or corporate 
issuers, should be treated as the ultimate client of the securities authority.160   
So what specific actions can a securities authority take to be the investor’s 
advocate?  Investors must see that the regulator is taking appropriate 
regulatory and enforcement actions for their benefit.  In general, this 
requirement can be met by bringing enforcement cases that will serve to 
protect the interest of investors, including recovery of assets for defrauded 
investors.161  Additionally, the securities laws should require, and the 
regulators should ensure, that investors have access to quality information 
from issuing companies and the brokerage firms.  If a securities authority 
focuses its efforts on leveling the playing field for the individuals and small 
players, then most market development and regulatory goals will fall into 
                                                                                                                   
 159 Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the SEC Speaks in 2011 (Feb. 4, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch020411tap.htm. 
 160 This does not mean that the securities authority serves as private counsel to individual 
investors, but rather that it uses its enforcement program to benefit investors as a whole.  Even 
so, many SEC cases result in the collateral benefit of recovery for the harmed investors. 
 161 See, e.g., The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www. 
sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified Feb. 28, 2011) (“Common violations that may 
lead to SEC investigations include: misrepresentation or omission of important information 
about securities; manipulating the market prices of securities; stealing customers’ funds or 
securities; violating broker-dealers’ responsibility to treat customers fairly; insider trading 
(violating a trust relationship by trading on material, non-public information about a security); 
and selling unregistered securities.”). 
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place.  A capital market regulator should ask this fundamental question in 
connection with every regulatory and enforcement action: “How is this 
action we are considering today going to benefit investors?”    
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Regulators can never keep up with the dynamic innovation of a well-
functioning capital market, and perhaps this is as it should be.  They must, 
however, keep up with the frauds and abuses on the market.  While the key 
elements that have been identified in this Article may be some of the best 
available today, of overriding importance is to give a securities authority a 
broad mandate and flexible tools that it can use to adapt to ever-changing 
market conditions and to deal with the increasing sophistication of those who 
abuse the market and investors.  The government authorities and the 
securities industry share the same fundamental goals, which are to attract 
investors, lower the cost of capital, and develop the market.  Getting this 
formula right can unleash the fullest potential of the capital markets, which 
will create jobs, eliminate poverty, and increase the standard of living for 
future generations. 
